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This paper analyses the techniques and technologies mobilized under the imprimatur of 
biological life in architectural production beyond their manifestations as (bio)mimetic processes. 
The arguments do not take ‘life’ as a priori to architectural thinking, but as immanent to each 
enactment of technique or application of technology within the biological paradigm. Using the 
work of Roger Caillois on pyschasthenia as the collapse of space between an organism and its 
milieu, the analysis avoids elevating biological life to a transcendent concept. Biological life in 
architecture instigates the pragmatic concern for whether a philosophical or scientific concept 
works, or matters, regardless of whether it fits within an ontology or metaphysics. Thus, 
architectural production using biological life subscribes to a Deleuzo-Guattarian “pedagogy of a 
concept” – the creation of perceptual and affective habits that are self-jeopardising and highly 
idiosyncratic to ensure further concept formation. 
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1 Introduction 
Concepts of emergence and self-organisation in architectural practice, whose foundations lay in 
the concept of ‘life’, herald a return of the biological paradigm to architecture. Current transfers 
of the biological to the architectural stand more as technical and technological concerns – that 
is, concerns of process and method – than straightforwardly formal ones. In this paper I argue 
that it is more productive to see biological life in contemporary architecture, especially in the 
field of experimental digital architecture or what Michael Hensel and others have called 
“morphogenetic design”, as not a priori to architectural thinking, but rather as a force effectuated 
at each enactment of particular techniques and technologies. The potential of the biological 
paradigm for architecture is much more than its manifestation as mimetic formal or 
methodological processes because in the enactment of the biological is the very possibility of 
differential conceptions of life. Life in this case becomes more of a contingent but generic quality 
rather than a predetermined condition; which moves the notions of transfers of technique, and 
transformations of the technological, away from instrumentalist definitions. Life is the 
immanence of biological techniques and technologies to its transfers and transformations in 
architecture. 
The aim of this paper therefore is not to find new potentials for the biological paradigm, whether 
from science and philosophy, to be used in architecture, nor will it outline how architecture is 
appropriating the biological, or why we are seeing a resurgence of this practice. The paper 
argues that in the current biological paradigm, the concept of life does not arrive in architecture 
from the outside through interdisciplinary transfer, nor is it intrinsically internal to the biological. 
Life as a concept in architecture can be cultivated (as in habits), and remains divergent (as in 
mood or atmosphere) without relying upon an a priori object. 
2 Searching for and identifying life 
The appeal of a biological paradigm in architecture is, in short, to find relations between the 
material world and the possibility of its own generation, development and therefore 
sustainability. This model of the world relinquishes the human being as progenitor and creative 
source of material transformation towards cultural production. In corollary, the biological 
paradigm instates the non-human world with an interior, perhaps primordial, creative force given 
by a certain consistency or organization of the beings within it. What this means is techniques 
and technologies arising from a biological paradigm in a cultural production such as architecture 
become the search for life within categories of materiality, systems and their relations, outside 
the imprimatur of the category called the human being.  
The process of identifying life in the material world – to ascertain if something has the quality of 
being alive or not – whether as biological organisms (animal or vegetative) or biochemically 
synthetic forms (naturally occurring or otherwise), adheres to strict criteria. The main criterion is 
the capacity for self-organisation and dynamics. For example, in discussing the literal transfer of 
the biological paradigm into architecture, Michael Hensel, quoting Hungarian chemical engineer 
and biologist Tibor Gánti, states that the criteria for life identify the ability of the organism or 
system to enact transformations of states and material (for example metabolism), communicate 
and transfer information, control internal states in relation to the external environment, 
development and reproduction, and finally mortality (19-20). 
The ground for these criteria is given by two metaphysical assumptions. Firstly, the existence of 
a frame which partitions the inside and outside that establishes an architectonic unity. And 
secondly, the registration of life within this unity relies upon the enactment of a visual difference 
from the unity, taking the form of a ‘response’.  
Architecture has since the beginning of Western thought provided philosophy with the ground 
for the operation of metaphysics and culture. Architecture in descriptions of itself sets up 
relations between inside and outside, above and below, and space and boundary; relations 
which philosophy protects as incontrovertible in order to do its work, and in doing so establishes 
what Mark Wigley calls an “epistemological contract” with architecture (5). More importantly, 
philosophy’s debt to the architectural already always defines the how the life can appear 
through the definition of what is human. Architecture in its history has played a role in 
partitioning human life as outside an undifferentiated interior biological life. In Aristotle, zoé or 
bare life as the unqualified life of natural (or domestic) reproduction that does not subscribe to 
constituted sovereignty, is differentiated from the bios as life exteriorly qualified by the 
law/language towards a usefulness within a political community (Agamben 7). 
Within the biological paradigm in architecture, life emerges as a functionalist explanation. In 
order that human life can be partitioned from biological life, the latter must be defined in such a 
way that it is available as a unit of differentiation and manipulation. The definition of biological 
life literally arrives from the possibility of ‘containment’, that is, a differentiation between 
interiority and exteriority. At its most elementary scale containment is given by the unified space 
of the biological cell as a basic unit of life. As a criterion for life, containment “implies that a 
system must be inherently an individual unit, a function provided by biological membranes”, and 
is given by the unity established as the equilibrium between complex “environmental stresses 
from the exterior as well as the pathogenic processes from the interior of the cell” (Hensel 20-
21). 
Biological life forms are also recognized as having the quality of being ‘alive’ because they 
respond. Their responses are organized by an energy that appears as involuntary reactions to 
their milieu, whether defined by external environmental stimuli or internal need. The ability to 
respond is another frame that sets up a difference between interiority and exteriority of life. The 
frame of stimulus and response ‘spaces’ life.  
The frame becomes an architectural limit idea which conditions the very possibility of life itself, 
even before, according to Bernard Caché, we can recognize the frame as an image (xi). The 
issue with life as a functionalist explanation is not the use of biology to explain the human being, 
but lies with the visuality of biological life in relation to human beings. Biological life can be seen; 
it is a Kantian a priori idea. It has a predetermined image whose characteristics are historically 
understood and admired, leading to the desire for mimicry to establish a visual correspondence 
between the processes of human material production and natural processes. However, the 
image of the biological life in such biomimicry arrives from one that which is already partitioned 
in a certain manner (away from the human, arguably by architecture since the Renaissance). 
The image of biological life is one based on a contained, captive organism reduced to its 
fundamental behaviours of survival.  
What are the implications of this line of reasoning in response to biological life as a frame for 
contemporary architectural techniques and technologies, especially those that have arisen with 
the development of digital visualization and design capabilities? More specifically, how do we 
philosophically deal with the mimetic correspondence between biological life and architectural 
production as a quality whose frame primarily relies upon relations that are governed by a 
certain regime of visuality, when it is architecture that provides the frame which makes visible 
the qualities of that life in the first place? The rest of this paper traces a line through the complex 
field of framing in biomimicry, the implicit collapse of the space between the biological organism 
and its milieu, to argue particular digital techniques or computing technologies in architecture 
are not anterior to the concept of life and vice versa, but that the concept of biological life is 
something that is inseparable from the techniques and technologies in architecture, where the 
latter are themselves emergent in their grasping of, and being grasped by, the concept of life. It 
is more productive to see the concept of biological life as habit that can be cultivated, with a 
‘pedagogy’ that can be developed.  
3 Captivation 
Biological life, having been defined in history through an architectural partitioning of space 
between inside and outside, provides the condition of captivation necessary for the  
identification and categorization of the organism. The conventional sense of captivation is the 
enclosure by architectural walls, as in ‘captivity’. Captivation can alternatively be read as an 
inconspicuous (un)attentive comportment to the world, as in ‘to be captivated by’. Giorgio 
Agamben, working inside Heidegger’s idea of ‘the open’ in which human beings captivated by 
the world have the possibility of authentic thought, argues that human beings in fact become 
more animalized when they are captivated in or by the unconcealment of the world. The 
condition which reifies Agamben’s reading of ‘the open’ is boredom (61). The experience, or 
more specifically the non-experience, of boredom results from suspension of conscious thought 
or circumspective comportment. Here existence is undifferentiated from the milieu. The world of 
captivation is close to an existence that matters no matter what comes, as it is life sharply cued 
into certain conditions in which the world is open to the organism as an unending horizon of 
events that pertain to basic biological activities such as eating and shelter. For humans, this 
occurs in the partitioned spaces where the architecture is inconspicuous where there is a 
suspension of self-consciousness, where the human can be naked or disclosed, and where it 
pursues its basic survival activities. This is the space of habits, or particular combinations of 
materiality, structure and movement which hold off conspicuous introspection towards a kind of 
releasement. This is quite possibly the space of the home, or the daily work environment. Here 
is where the human in captivation learns to be bored, and becomes biological, becomes animal. 
Life in captivation is therefore not related to consciousness or biological form per se, nor is this 
state of biological life a pathological or ‘other’ condition of the human. The definition of biological 
life that is of concern here is, as Catherine Ingraham puts it, radically outside, as unknowable, to 
humanness (86). 
4 Mimicry 
Captivation, as a space of biological survival, sees the collapse of difference between the milieu 
and the organism. In some animals, insects in the main, this pursuit of survival manifests as a 
repertoire of behavior related to mimicry, or morphogenetic transformations, where their forms 
mimic the surrounding environment. For example, stick and leaf insects evolve to be visually 
similar to their habitat, and the large eyes on butterfly wings develop in such as way to make the 
insect look like a bird. Natural mimicry is the limit state of the captivation of an animal by its 
milieu.  
In his seminal essay “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia”, biologist and dissident surrealist 
Roger Caillois argues that the Darwinian evolutionary advantage of mimicry is on many 
occasions a fallacy (16-32). Leaf insects by their appearance as leaves increase the propensity 
of being cannibalized by their fellow insects; and stick insects by being sticks have the 
propensity of being snapped off as twigs or fed on by sparrows. Furthermore, mimicry does not 
serve survival because it works in the realm of the visual while hunting primarily works at the 
level of smell (Krauss 155). The evolutionary non-benefit of mimicry therefore overturns 
functionalist explanations of the animal and biological behavior. But yet, there is an undeniable 
primitive and overwhelming tendency to imitate – and this applies as much in the human realm 
as that of the animal; all we have to do is look down the history of architecture or art for the 
imitations of nature – with a belief in the efficacy of this imitation. 
What is of interest to me in Caillois’s work is that mimicry enacts a spatial condition, namely the 
collapse of the space of difference. Mimicry, as a visual act which relies upon similarity or 
likeness, puts pressure on the space of differentiation that subsists between things, between the 
biological organism (and in the current discussions of architectural practice, the human animal) 
and its milieu. Caillois compares the natural phenomena of mimicry and the psychiatric 
condition of psychasthenia, the loss of ego owing to a disturbance in the experience of space, 
whereby the ego no longer has a form because its difference from its milieu is dissolved by that 
experience of space. The ego has a lessened individuality so to speak as it sees itself as one 
point amongst many others, until it knows not where to place itself. This biological human is in 
dark space where there is no differentiation between its body and its surroundings. 
Architectural theorists such as Ingraham in Architecture, Animal, Human: The Asymmetrical 
Condition and Elizabeth Grosz in Architecture from the Outside have used the condition of 
psychasthenia, largely through a reprise of Caillois’s essay, to breach the separation of the 
Cartesian subject from its non-human milieu, or generally the inside-outside distinction, in 
architectural thinking. If we apply this thinking to the biomimicry implicit in some digital 
architectural practice, whether the resultant architectural forms mimic natural organismic 
behavior or structuration, or the use of parametric modeling which introduces design methods 
able to instrumentalize complex systems and control morphogenetic structurations; which in turn 
provide designers with the capacity to develop ‘long chain’ associations of geometric constructs, 
changes in behavior and procedural representations, and responsive materiality; and where 
editing and re-execution of design history is made possible; we are faced with a visuality in 
architecture that diminishes the perspectival relations between the viewer and the milieu in 
favour of a diffracted visuality. What I mean here is that the conditions of vision and perception 
may not be a possession of the human subject, but might in fact constitute the human subject, 
or dispossesses it. The human is dispossessed of its assumed centrality in vision. Instead its 
milieu pinions the human as a biological subject within its stare, or captivation. This 
dispossession, where the human gives itself over to its own blinding, and its primary existence 
is merely a spot within the complex scopic field, inscribes human life into the biological picture 
rather than being removed from it as the source of creation. We stand in a milieu we cannot 
place, that absolutely cannot be mastered by the logic of vision. Through captivation, the human 
is seen as immanent in, rather than sees, the milieu.  
To me this is when the human moves closest to the quality of biological life. Such an existence 
associated with the collapse of space brings about a radically indeterminate comportment to the 
world. Life itself, the natural and the biological, is co-produced in architecture as material, 
processual and spatial. It is here that relations between form and content, thought and matter, 
organic and inorganic, the organism and its milieu, are reworked. Biological life becomes a 
concept that works like a generic category. It remains as having no accepted measure, but it 
nevertheless functions as an event site. As generic quality, the life can only be approached 
always and only as becoming-life. Life as concept and process in architectural production is 
therefore immanent to the forms it takes.  
The revelation by the techniques and technologies in architectural production cannot therefore 
be anticipated, and is highly impersonal (it has less to do with the individual biological human, 
and more the non-individualistic or generic category of the biological). And in this way the 
newness in architectural production within the biological paradigm is both transcendental (as in 
trans-historical) and immanent (as in emergent in the event). This double fold forces knowledge 
to increase the anticipation of the full truth of life – a truth which never arrives – but allows 
architectural theory and practice, as Alain Badiou says of the politics of philosophy (29-31), to 
act with conviction and fidelity. 
5 Pedagogy of a concept, habit formation 
Such a non-teleological and ontologically indeterminate framework treats biological life a 
‘concept’ as described by Deleuze and Guattari. Life is a concept and not a proposition, 
because the truth of a proposition relies upon an outside state of affairs to which it refers, while 
the concept is internally organized whereby it is always already, and only, the partial 
interconnections with other concepts around it. Life as a concept has its own regions of visibility 
and effectuation, each with a series of techniques and technologies. Concepts are not created 
out of nothing; there is no genius-creator behind concepts, but their creation is immanent to a 
constant reaching out and being reached by other concepts. Deleuze and Guattari describe the 
internal consistency of concepts as follows: 
“As fragmentary totalities, concepts are not even the pieces of a puzzle, for their irregular 
contours do not correspond to each other. They do form a wall, but it is a dry-stone wall, 
and everything holds together only along divergent lines” (23). 
Concepts are therefore created by a self-positing. So, on one hand, the concept in its self-
positing is absolute and therefore ontological; on the other, it is relative in its creation and 
therefore has a pedagogy. What does it mean to have a ‘pedagogy of a concept’ in inherent in 
its creation? For a concept to live, it necessarily summons certain words, images, and 
structures. The choices of these material instantiations evoke a link to what Deleuze calls a 
‘philosophical taste’.  
“The concept’s baptism calls for a specifically philosophical taste that proceeds with 
violence or by insinuation and constitutes a philosophical language within language – not 
just a vocabulary but a syntax that attains the sublime or great beauty” (8). 
For example in the biological paradigm, the qualities of life resonate within words such as 
‘emergence’, ‘evolution’, and ‘consistency’. These words then make up a whole way of speaking 
that is immanent to the concept of life; it is what the concept is. The concept’s sole object is the 
inseparability of the components which constitute its consistency and through which it passes 
back and forth. The philosophical concept does not refer to the ‘lived’ by way of abstraction, but 
through its own creation it sets up an event which Deleuze and Guattari says “surveys the whole 
of the lived no less than every state of affairs” (33-34). 
So how does the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the concept relate to the conditions made 
available by biological life as a concept in the techniques and technologies in digital 
architecture?  Biological life as a concept gives life to strange beings, beings which matter if 
they fulfil with fidelity the scientific and design constraints set by the techniques and 
technologies to unfold the architectural problem to its fullest potential, a move which at the 
same time holds the risk of being monstrous, dangerous, and disastrous (Stengers 165). This 
relativity in the pedagogy of a concept means being in a debt we need to honour in relation to 
what makes one call up the concept in the first place. Science has given architecture the 
concepts of ‘nature’, ‘animal’, ‘biological life’. Architectural philosophy needs to deal with the 
flights they induce, concepts they create and habits they disturb; not to justify, rationalise or 
interpret biological science in architecture, but to care that truth of the problem achieves the 
production of its own specific empowering means and obligations. 
6 Conclusion 
The biological paradigm in architecture does not merely provide formal concepts which are 
mimicked or appropriated by human designers, nor are the relations between human and 
biological beings made closer. The concept biological life is where human beings encounter a 
comportment to the world which it cannot anticipate, which plunges them into an immanent 
relation with specific techniques and technologies, their transfers and transformations, 
whereupon life itself emerges. In this way, the paper is interested in the space of the subject 
and the space of architectural design, not in and of themselves, but because they are co-
emergent. 
In biological life is a pragmatic concern of whether a philosophical concept works, or matters, 
regardless whether it fits within a universal ontology or metaphysics. Life, which subscribes to 
the ‘pedagogy of a concept’, is necessarily a non-consensual and divergent convention. Herein 
lies a new paradigm of ethico-aesthetics, whereby life becomes a pragmatically functioning but 
constantly diverging event which serves nothing more than to empower new habits; habits that 
are self-jeopardising and highly idiosyncratic, to ensure further concept creation.  
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